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I. Introduction
The effects of trade liberalization on child labor are widely debated, and public and political interest in the issue is high. From a theoretical perspective these effects are a priori unclear (Ranjan 2001; Jafarey and Lahiri 2002) , as trade liberalization acts potentially through several channels, changing relative prices, real income distribution, wages, and net returns to education. The arising income and substitution effects can both raise and reduce workforce participation of children. Bedi, Sebi Buhai, Eric Edmonds, Pedro Goulart, Michael Grimm, Umbu Reku Raya, Guenther Schulze, Bambang Sjahrir Putra, and Empirical evidence on the issue is scarce. Cross-country studies generally find trade liberalization to be associated with lower incidence of child labor on average (Cigno, Rosati, and Guarcello 2002) , a relationship that seems most likely to be driven by the effect of trade on income, as more open economies have less child labor because they are richer (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006) . Kis-Katos (2007) finds differential effects of trade openness, with smaller reductions in child labor for the poorest food exporting countries. However, empirical studies based on micro data and direct evidence from trade reforms are required to understand the heterogenous effects from trade liberalization and identify the main channels at work. For example, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b) find that rice price increases due to a dismantling of export quotas in Vietnam led to an overall decrease in child labor in the 1990s, especially due to the relatively evenly distributed favorable income effects. In contrast, Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) find that in rural India, districts that have been more strongly exposed to trade liberalization have experienced smaller increases in school enrollment on average, which they argue is primarily due to the unfavorable income effects to the poor and the relatively high costs of education in these districts.
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This study contributes to the microempirical literature by examining the trade liberalization experience of Indonesia in the 1990s, which, given the vast geographic heterogeneity of the archipelago, offers an interesting case study on the effects of trade liberalization on child work. In preparation to and following its accession to the WTO, Indonesia went through a major reduction in tariff barriers: average import tariff lines decreased from around 17.2 percent in 1993 to 6.6 percent in 2002. During that same period the workforce participation of children aged 10-15 years more than halved. Due to Indonesia's size and geographic variation in economic structure, the various districts have been very differently affected by trade liberalization, which offers us a valuable identification strategy.
Our identification strategy follows that of Topalova (2005) and Edmonds et al. (2010) , as we combine geographic variation in sector composition of the economy and temporal variation in tariff lines by product category, yielding geographic variation in (changes in) average exposure to trade liberalization over time. We extend this approach by going beyond the fixed effects approach employed in earlier studies and investigate the dynamic effects of trade liberalization. We also test the robustness of our results to alternative measures of geographic exposure to trade liberalization, by weighting tariffs on different products by the shares these sectors take in (i) regional structure of employment (defined by both including and excluding nontradables), and (ii) the regional GDP. These measures reflect different dimensions of households' exposure to trade liberalization: the former two through labor market dynamics, the latter through the distributional effects of local economic growth.
The analysis draws on a variety of data sources. Indonesia's annual national household survey (Susenas) provides information on the main activities of children and their basic socioeconomic characteristics. We use four rounds of this repeated crosssection data, spaced at three-year intervals between 1993 and 2002. As the Susenas is representative at the district level, we apply our analysis both at the individual level using pooled repeated cross-section data with district fixed effects, and at the district level with pseudo-panel data for 261 districts. The data on economic structure of the districts comes from information on regional GDP (GRDP) of the Central Bureau of Statistics in Indonesia (BPS), while district-level employment shares and further controls are based on Susenas. Additional district-level information is derived from PODES, the Village Potential Census. Finally, information on tariff lines comes from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database.
We find that stronger exposure to trade liberalization has led to a decrease in child labor among the 10-15 year olds. The effects are strongest for children from lowskill backgrounds, for older siblings, and in rural areas. Favorable income effects for the poor induced by trade liberalization are likely to be the dominating effects underlying these results as we find larger decreases in poverty in the districts that were most affected by trade liberalization.
The next section of the paper provides a theoretical framework for our analysis. The third section elaborates on the context of the tariff reductions in Indonesia, and the developments in child labor for our study period. Section 4 presents the data and sets out the identification strategy. The results are then discussed in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes.
II. Theoretical Background
Child labor can be seen as resulting from a household decision that is made subject to a budget constraint and constraints on the child's time use. Credit market imperfections further increase child labor, because the household cannot borrow against the child's future income in order to invest into education, even if the discounted net returns to education would be positive.
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In this framework, child labor is determined by an interaction between the necessity and the opportunities to work, credit constraints, returns to school, as well as parental preferences; however, its close link to poverty remains undisputed (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005a). Hence, reductions in trade barriers are more likely to lead to reductions in child labor if they are going to benefit the poor in the economy. Based on standard Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, trade liberalization has been commonly expected to alleviate poverty in developing countries (see for instance, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 2002). However, as increases in unskilled wages also raise the opportunity costs of children not working, the overall effects on child labor are a priori not clear.
Even in its simplest version, the Stolper-Samuelson reasoning does not necessarily imply a reduction in child labor due to trade liberalization, as the resulting income and substitution effects point in different directions. In a Heckscher-Ohlin economy with two mobile factors, low and high-skilled labor, and two industries producing one export and one import-competing good, reducing import tariffs leads to a decrease in the relative price of the imported good with respect to the numéraire (export good). On the production side, there will be a shift towards the production of exportables with low-skill intensity, which in turn raises the demand for unskilled labor, 1. Credit constraints and imperfect smoothing seem a reasonable assumption for most developing countries, at least for those households that send their children to work, as credit constraints are among the main causes for child labor (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2006) . For Indonesia, Kis-Katos and Schulze (forthcoming) show that credit availability is closely related to the incidence of child labor in small businesses.
increases unskilled wages and hence reduces the skill premium in the economy.
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The price changes also will lead to consumption shifts, and the overall effects of trade liberalization are expected to be positive (gains from trade).
Households will be affected by changing goods and factor prices through two main channels. First, changes in wages and goods prices alter the real income of the households. If the parents have unskilled labor, an increase in the export price should increase adult income; this favorale income effect should in turn decrease child labor. Second, shifts in the relative prices of goods and opportunity costs of not working result in substitution effects that lead to a further reallocation of consumption and labor supply. If the substitution effect of an increase in child wages dominates its income effect, the rising child wages will increase child labor supply.
3 Thus, while real incomes of the poor low-skill households should increase after trade liberalization, the overall reaction of child labor is not clear-cut, since rising real wages of the unskilled increase the incentives to work. 4 The overall sign of these effects depends on whether the favorable income effects or the substitution effects are dominating. Departures from the Stolper-Samuelson reasoning that result additionally in negative income effects for the poor make an increase in child labor more likely.
The expected favorable effects of trade liberalization on child labor depend crucially on the incomes of the poor increasing due to trade. Although the StolperSamuelson reasoning presents a very powerful argument in favor of these expectations, under many circumstances trade liberalization might fail to benefit the poor (Davis and Mishra 2007) . If a developing country trades not only with more but also with less skill-abundant countries than itself, reductions in tariffs on goods with the lowest-skill intensity also may hurt the poor by reducing the demand for leastskilled labor. The expected increases in unskilled wages also can be reduced or even missing if the effects of trade liberalization are accompanied by skill biased technological change. In contrast, reductions in tariffs on goods that are not produced within a country will have no effects on producers and will only benefit consumers of those goods.
Favorable income effects are more likely to occur if intersectoral worker mobility is high and markets are competitive, which corresponds to a longer run perspective.
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If workers' skills are industry-specific instead and hence the between industry mobility is low, workers might be harmed in the short run by reductions in protection. In a constrained economic environment, with imperfect smoothing, such short-term 2. These price effects might be both mitigated and enhanced in the presence of nontradable goods (for example, inputs producing education): If the import-competing sector is more capital intensive than both the exporting and the nontraded sectors (as it might be expected in a developing economy), the relative price of the nontraded good with respect to the exportable will rise. Overall demand and production shifts will in this case depend on the relative factor intensities of each industry and the gross substitutability of all goods in consumption (Komiya 1967) . 3. Additionally, dynamic effects of falling skill premia could make investment into education less profitable. But as technological upgrading is certainly an issue in the long run, this gives an additional motive for human capital accumulation and makes the longer-term relevance of short-term falls in skill premia questionable. 4. See Kis-Katos and Sparrow (2009) for a more formal exposition of the underlying relationships. 5. Reductions in protection also are more likely to benefit the poor if labor market policies are flexible, and if social safety nets are well-functioning (Harrison 2007). economic shocks also can have long-term consequences for the poor. For instance, decisions on withdrawing a child from school in face of a shock are often irreversible and can have intergenerational effects.
Empirical evidence on the effects of globalization on poverty is partly inconclusive, because, contrary to the Stolper-Samuelson predictions, many empirical studies do not observe reductions either in poverty or in wage inequality in developing countries that reduced tariffs unilaterally (see Harrison 2007) . 6 For Indonesia, however, the pro-poor effects of trade liberalization are not unlikely: Suryahadi (2001) documents rising unskilled wages over the period of trade liberalization in the 1990s, while Sitalaksmi, Ismalina, Fitrady, and Robertson (2007) find improvements in perceived working conditions. Indeed, our results seem to suggest that tariff reductions have induced positive income effects and reduced poverty, eventually leading to a reduction in rural child labor.
Our empirical analysis will focus on the effects of trade liberalization propagated through changes in the composition of economic activity, and will abstract from eventual changes in consumption patterns. 7 We concentrate on the effects of trade liberalization on child labor, but not on schooling, since consistent data on school attendance is not available for the study period.
III. Trade Liberalization and Children in Indonesia

A. Trade Liberalization in the 1990s
Trade liberalization in Indonesia took place over more than 15 years. From the mid1980s the former import substitution policy has been gradually replaced by a less restrictive trade regime, tariff lines have been reduced while at the same time a slow tarification of nontariff barriers took place (Basri and Hill 2004) . This laid the ground to the next wave of trade liberalization in the mid-1990s, with rising foreign firm ownership and increasing export and import penetration.
8 Tariff reductions were particularly strong in the 1990s, with Indonesian trade liberalization policy in that decade being defined by two major events: the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994 and Indonesia's commitment to multilateral agreements on tariff reductions, and the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the postcrisis recovery process. After the Uruguay round Indonesia committed itself to reduce all of its bound tariffs to less than 40 percent within ten years. In May 1995 a large package of tariff reductions was announced, which laid down the schedule of major tariff reductions until 2003, and implemented further commitments of Indonesia to the Asia Pacific Economic 6. Other studies show however that accounting for geographic (Chiquiar 2008) or within-industry (Verhoogen 2008) heterogeneity can help to identify Stolper-Samuelson linkages in developing countries. 7. For our empirical strategy this implies that differences in district-level trends in the composition of consumption are assumed to be unrelated to the districts' economic production structure; in which case not controlling for the consumption channel will not confound our estimates. 8. Arguably, cronyism and specific protection of a few industries with ties to the Soeharto familyespecially chemicals, motor vehicles, and steel-reduced the effect of overall liberalization. However, the largest part of the cronyism occurred in nontraded sectors and did not further affect protection of the traded sectors (Basri and Hill 2004, p. 637) .
Figure 1 Tariff reductions in Indonesia
Cooperation (Fane 1999) . Although the removal of specific nontariff barriers was accompanied by a temporary rise in tariffs (especially in the food manufacturing sector), this did not affect the overall declining trend in any major way. Figure 1 shows the reduction in tariff lines over time and the variation between industries. On average, nominal tariffs reduced from 17.2 percent in 1993 to 6.6 percent in 2002. In this period the strongest reductions occurred from 1993 to 1995 and during the post crisis period after 1999. While tariffs decreased across the board, there were marked differences in initial levels and in the extent of the decrease. Manufacturing started with relatively high tariff barriers but also showed the strongest reductions. For example, wood and furniture saw tariffs decline from 27.2 to 7.9 percent, textiles from 24.9 to 8.1 percent, and other manufacturing from 18.9 to 6.4 percent. The average tariffs for agriculture were already much lower, reducing from 11.5 to 3.0 percent.
Existing studies on the effects of Indonesian trade liberalization document both increased firm productivity and improvements of working conditions in manufacturing. At the plant-level, Amiti and Konings (2007) find that trade liberalization affected firms' productivity through two main channels: falling tariffs on imported inputs fostered learning and raised both product quality and variety, while falling output protection increased the competitive pressures. Comparing the two effects they argue that gains from falling input tariffs were considerably higher. Firm productivity also has been strongly affected by FDI flows, as firms with increasing foreign ownership experienced restructuring, employment and wage growth, as well as stronger linkages to export and import markets (Arnold and Smarzynska Javorcik 2005) . At the same time, working conditions seem to have improved, especially in manufacturing. Using individual employment data, Sitalaksmi et al. (2007) argue that the increase in export-oriented foreign direct investment went along with rising relative wages in the textile and apparel sector. Additionally, working conditions, proxied by workers' own assessment of their income, working facilities, medical benefits, safety considerations, and transport opportunities, improved over time in the expanding manufacturing industries as compared to agriculture.
Based on a microsimulation exercise Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel, and Cranfield (2004) argue that full multilateral trade liberalization is expected to decrease household poverty in Indonesia, although self-employed agricultural households would be the most likely losers of trade liberalization in the short run, which is mainly due to the assumption that self-employed labor is immobile in the short run. In the longer run some former agricultural workers will be moving into the formal wage labor market and the poverty headcount could be expected to fall for all sectors. However, the mobility of low-skill labor, and hence the speed and ability to exploit the opportunities from trade liberalization, may be underestimated by Hertel et al. (2004) . For example, Suryahadi, Suryadarma, and Sumarto (2009) show that during the 1990s the agriculture employment share dropped from 50 to 40 percent, while the services share increased from 33 to 42 percent. In addition, they attribute most of the poverty reductions in that decade to growth in urban services. This is further supported by Suryahadi (2001) , who documents a fast increase in the employment of skilled labor force as well as a decline in wage inequality (faster wage growth for the unskilled) during trade liberalization in Indonesia, although he does not establish causality.
B. Child Work
Indonesia experienced a steady decline in child work in the 30 years before the Indonesian economic crisis, but this decline halted with the onset of the crisis (Suryahadi, Priyambada, and Sumarto 2005). Nevertheless, market work among children aged 10-15 increased only slightly in response to the economic crisis (Cameron 2001) . During the crisis children have been moving out of the formal wage employment sector into other small-scaled activities (Manning 2000) , but the labor supply response seems to be concentrated with older cohorts.
The overall decline in child work is portrayed in Figure 2 , for boys and girls, and by different age groups. Child work is here defined as any work activity that contributes to household income. From 1993 to 2002, the incidence of child work halves for children of junior secondary school age (13-15 years old), and is cut by more than 70 percent for children age 10-12. This decline is observed for both boys and girls, although boys engage in market work more than girls. In 2002 market work incidence for boys age 13-15 years is 14.8 percent, and 2.3 percent at age 10-12. Among girls market work incidence is 10.0 and 1.6 percent for the same age groups, respectively.
Agriculture is the main sector for child work, and developments in this sector are driving the overall trends, as shown in Figure 3 . In 1993 just over 75 percent of child work in the age group 10-12 occurred in agriculture, while two in three child workers aged 13-15 worked in agriculture. The dominance of the agricultural sector in child work translates into a 79 and 69 percent share in the overall reduction in child work for the two age groups, respectively. However, the relative changes from 1993 to 2002 are remarkably constant across sectors. ' '
Figure 2
Work of children, by gender and age group
Figure 3 Sectoral distribution of child work (aged 10-15 years)
In line with the trends in child labor, Indonesia has shown strong improvements in education attainment over past decades, reaching almost universal primary school enrollment in the mid 1980s (Jones and Hagul 2001) . Indonesia's current nine-year basic education policy aims at achieving universal enrollment up to junior secondary school. But while junior secondary school enrollment has certainly improved, the large drop out of around 30 percent in the transition from primary to junior secondary remains a problem. Other problems that are still cause for concern are delayed enrollment, relatively high repetition rates, teacher quality and absenteeism, and lack of access to secondary schools in remote and rural areas (World Bank 2006) .
In the remainder of this analysis we focus on child work activities by primary school age children close to the transition point, age 10-12, and junior secondary school age children, age 13 to 15. For children younger than 10 information on work is not available.
IV. Data and Empirical Approach
A. Data
Indonesia's national socioeconomic household survey, Susenas, provides information on the outcome variables and socioeconomic characteristics for individuals and households. The Susenas is conducted annually around January-February, typically sampling approximately 200,000 households, and is representative at the district level. The district will be our main unit of analysis, as districts take a key role as the main administrative units in Indonesia, and the regional labor markets also are best defined in district terms.
Districts are defined as municipalities (Kota) or predominantly rural areas (Kabupaten). Each district (both the Kota and Kabupaten) can be further divided into urban precincts (Kelurahan) and rural villages (Desa). It is important to emphasize the difference between these two urban/rural indicators, since we will use both variables in our analysis. A district classified as a rural Kabupaten mainly consists of rural villages, but also may include small towns that are registered as urban precincts in the data. In a similar vein, districts classified as urban Kota mainly contain urban precincts and neighborhoods, but also may cover some rural areas at the fringes, which are then registered as villages. 9 The Kota/Kabupaten classification will therefore appear as a fixed effect in our analysis, but we also will investigate the differential effects of tariff reduction for municipalities and rural districts. In addition, we will include the Desa/Kelurahan division as time variant control variable within districts.
The outcome variables record whether a child has worked in the last week. As mentioned earlier, market work is defined as activities that directly generate household income, irrespectively of whether it was performed at the formal labor market or within the family. We distinguish it from domestic work, which consists of household chores only. The Susenas also provides information on education attainment of other household members, household composition, monthly household expenditure, and sector of employment.
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Information on tariff lines comes from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database. These reflect the simple average of all applied tariff rates, which tend to be substantially 9. The exception are the five districts comprising the capital Jakarta, which are completely urban. 10. The Susenas also collects data on schooling. But, unfortunately, the data on school attendance cannot be used for this study as it is not consistent over time due to changes in the questionnaire between 1996 and 1999. lower than the bound tarrifs during the 1990s (WTO 1998; WTO 2003) . As data on tariff lines is not available for some years (1994, 1997, and 1998) , we use information from four three-year intervals (1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002) both in the pooled cross-section and in the district panel. We can consistently match the relevant product categories to sectoral employment data derived from Susenas at the onedigit level.
The sectoral share of GDP per district that we use for constructing an alternative tariff weighting scheme is derived from the Regional GDP (GRDP) data of the Central Bureau of Statistics in Indonesia (BPS). The district GRDP are available from 1993 onward, and breaks down district GDP by one-digit sector, of which the tradable sectors are agriculture, manufacturing, and mining/quarrying. Some districts have been dropped from the analysis. Districts in Aceh, Maluku, and Irian Jaya have not been included in the Susenas in some years due to violent conflict situations at the time of the survey. In addition, the 13 districts in East Timor were no longer covered by Susenas after the 1999 referendum on independence. Another problem is that over the period 1993 to 2002 some districts have split up over time. To keep time consistency in the district definitions, we redefine the districts to the 1993 parent district definitions.
Since the Susenas rounds are representative for the district population in each year, we construct a district panel by pooling the four annually repeated crosssections. This yields a balanced panel of 261 districts, which reduces to 244 districts when we use the GRDP data. In addition to the pooled data, we also create a district pseudo-panel by computing district-level means for each variable, weighted by survey weights. The advantage of pooling the cross-section data is that we can work with individual level data and can account for individual heterogeneity. For example, we are interested in the differential impact for high-and low-skill labor, urban and rural areas, by birth order, and gender. On the other hand, in the pseudo-panel the observation unit is the district which allows us to investigate dynamic effects at the district level.
11 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Pooling the four years of Susenas data yields a sample of 458,401 observations for children age 10-15. The top panel of the table shows the outcome variables and the individual and household characteristics that we will use in the regressions. The bottom panel shows the descriptive statistics for the different tariff measures after they have been merged to the individual data. The table also reports the district specific poverty head count ratio (P 0 ) and poverty severity (P 2 ). The poverty measures are based on per capita expenditure data from Susenas and province-urban/rural specific poverty lines.
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B. Regional Tariff Exposure
Following Topalova (2005) and Edmonds et al. (2010) , tariff exposure measures are constructed by combining information on geographic variation in sector composition 11. In order to allow for heterogeneity in the district panel, we construct it not only for the whole sample but also for subsamples, divided by age, gender, the household head's education, birth order, and for rural and urban districts. 12. Details are described in Suryahadi, Sumarto, and Pritchett (2003) . 
The evolution of tariff protection, weighted by employment shares, is shown in Figure 4 . 13 This measure reflects how households are exposed to trade liberalization through local labor market dynamics. However, alternative measures of regional exposure to tariff reductions can be constructed, and we will probe into the robustness of our findings to the choice of tariff measure. First, regional difference in economic sector composition, and hence relative exposure to tariff reductions, also could be expressed in terms of total output, instead of employment shares. Thus, we can define exposure by weighting tariff lines by the sectoral shares in GRDP:
13. During the analyzed time span, rice prices were regulated, as the national trading company (BULOG) had an import monopoly on rice, while export bans on rice also were effective. Given the government's control of rice import and export, we exempt rice production from tradable agricultural good production, and reduce the labor and GRDP shares in tradable agriculture by the share of rice fields in agricultural plantations within each district. We compute this latter information from the 1993 village agricultural census (PODES).
This exposure measure differs considerably from exposure based on labor shares, as agriculture typically has relatively high employment but low economic production shares, while the opposite holds for manufacturing. This weighting scheme results in overall lower exposure since GRDP weights give a lower weight to agriculture than its importance in terms of employment. Second, we explore the sensitivity of our results to excluding nontradables in the weighting scheme. By assigning nontraded goods and services a zero tariff, as in Topalova (2005) and Edmonds et al. (2010) , our measure of tariff exposure will be relatively small in regions where the share of the nontradable (and hence not directly affected) sectors is large. However, Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2007) criticize this approach, finding very different results to Topalova (2005) when they weight tariff changes across traded sectors only.
14 We therefore construct a similar measure of tariff exposure, based on labor shares of the tradable sectors only. Sensitivity to excluding not-tradables would imply that our results hinge on the size of the nontradable sector in the regional economy.
Because regionally representative data on the sectoral composition of households is usually available only at the one-or two-digit level, we cannot distinguish tariff reductions on locally produced import-competing goods from tariff reductions on goods which are not produced locally. Instead, our focus lies on the interactions between overall trade liberalization and the regional differences in economic structure, which determine the extent to which a region might be negatively affected by reductions in protection but also the extent to which it might be able to benefit from the efficiency gains associated with more competition in the local economy.
C. Identification
Static Analysis: Pooled District Panel
Identification of the impact of tariff reductions relies on the geographic panel nature of the combined data, and in particular on the variation in tariff exposure over districts and over time. We include district fixed effects (␦ k ), while time-region fixed effects control for aggregate time trends ( rt ), allowing these to differ by the five main geographic areas of the archipelago: the islands of Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, and a cluster of smaller islands consisting of Bali and the Nusa Tenggara group. We also include a set of time variant household and individual control variables (X ikt ): a child's age, gender, and birth order, the education, gender, and main industry of occupation of the household head, the household size, and whether a household resides in an urban precinct or rural village (the Desa/Kelurahan composition of districts).
The main specification for the pooled district panel is
14. Although the difference in results between the two studies is striking, it remains unclear whether these conflicting results arise from differences in the unit of analysis, time frame, or specification.
where y ikt reflects work activities for child i in district k at time t. We estimate the model for the whole sample as well as separately for boys, girls, municipalities, and rural districts. The differential impact of trade liberalization is further explored by interacting tariff exposure with a set of individual chracteristics: the education as well as main occupation of the head of household (which also proxy for high-or low-skill labor) and the birth order of the children
Potential Sources of Bias
The main identifying assumption is that time variant shocks ε ikt are orthogonal to T kt . This would seem a reasonable assumption, given that T kt consists of the baseline economic structure and national changes in tariff regime. Thus, any temporal or regional variation endogenous to child work activities would be controlled for by time and geographic fixed effects. However, the identifying assumption would be violated if changes in district tariff exposure are endogenous to different local growth trajectories. Within the Indonesian context, regional variation in growth trajectories may be partly determined by initial conditions regarding sectoral composition. A first trend to note is that districts with a higher initial incidence of child labor experience larger decreases in child labor over time. This occurs in particular in rural areas, with the bulk of child work located in agriculture. Regional diversity in structural change from the primary to secondary and tertiary sectors and in economic outcomes is a prominent feature of Indonesia's economic geography. Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008) show evidence of strong regional variation in economic growth and structural change since the 1970s. However, they find only weak positive correlation between economic growth and structural change in districts. A related initial conditions problem, discussed at length by Edmonds et al. (2010) , lies with the nontradable sector. Districts may experience different growth paths, depending on the size of the nontradable sector.
Because the initial sectoral composition of district economies is at the heart of T kt , such differential trends in child labor could confound our estimates. We explore the scope of these confounding effects through an initial conditions sensitivity analysis and exploiting the panel features of the data.
Finally, social policy also could introduce confounding trends. Two policies are of particular concern for our analysis: changes in minimum wages and the 1998 crisis response. Minimum wages were introduced in Indonesia in the 1970s, and have increased strongly during the 1990s and between 2000 and 2002 (Alatas and Cameron 2008; . Minimum wage levels and changes vary by region and are influenced by local authorities. In 1998, in the wake of the economic crisis, a Social Safety Net (SSN) scholarship program was introduced to protect access to education for the poor. Sparrow (2007) finds that the scholarships decreased child labor, in particular for the poor and in rural areas. If regional variation in minimum wage levels or the impact of the scholarships is correlated with our tariff measure, then we may overestimate effects from trade liberalization on child labor. We therefore include minimum wage levels for provinces and the share of households in districts that receive SSN scholarships (in 1999 and 2002) 
Dynamic Analysis: District Pseudo-Panel
Collapsing the pooled district panel to a district pseudo-panel provides more options to further address the potential source of bias and allows a dynamic analysis, at the cost of losing the individual variation in the data. The district pseudo-panel analogue to Equation 3 is
where ȳ kt is the fraction of children in district k that work in a given year t. This specification is still prone to bias through time variant unobservables. However, with the fixed effects removed after a first-difference transformation of Equation 4, it provides a first indicative test of exogeneity of tariff exposure. which provides the testable hypothesis that ‫.0ס‬ As suggested by Edmonds et al. (2010) , the scope of the bias related to initial conditions can be investigated further by introducing initial sector shares as control variables. We therefore add initial conditions interacted with year dummy variables to Equation 5. Initial conditions are reflected by the 1993 labor shares of the agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, and transport sectors (with utilities as reference group), in addition to adult literacy rates in districts. If our tariff measures are endogenous to child work, or if they capture differential trends in child work between districts, we also would expect child work to be correlated with future changes in district tariff exposure. We test this by regressing changes in y from 1993 to 1996 on changes in T from 1999 to 2002 (DT kt‫2ם‬ ).
Finally, we exploit the pseudo-panel fully by taking a dynamic specification, where we include a lagged dependent variable and lagged tariff measure:
By including a lagged dependent variable we account for state dependence, and potential confounding differential trends in child labor between relatively high-and low-child labor districts. The lagged effects of tariff changes can identify short-and long-term effects. The immediate effect of a percentage point change in tariff exposure is reflected by ␤. The total long-term change in y as a result of a percentage point change in tariff exposure, taking into account lagged effects of tariff changes and its dynamic multiplier effect trough , is approximated by ‫.)מ1(/)ם␤(‬ ȳ kt‫1מ‬ However, introducing a lagged dependent variable to the model compromises consistency of fixed effects estimates, in particular when the time dimension of the panel is limited. We therefore adopt a GMM approach to resolve any bias from the lagged dependent variable and potential endogeneity of tariff exposure. We apply an Arellano-Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator, with a two-step Windmeijer (2005) correction. We treat tariff exposure and the lagged dependent as endogenous, and adult literacy as predetermined. First differences of these variables are then instrumented with their lagged levels. Lagged levels are expected to provide suffi-cient identifying variation and to be good predictors of future changes. In particular, since our data observes a period of structural change, hence the changes do not follow a random walk. For instance, the reductions in tariffs are closely correlated with their initial levels (with reductions being the highest in high tariff sectors). For the instruments to be valid, lagged levels have to be orthogonal to the first diferenced error term. This seems a plausible assumption for tariffs, as the results of sensitivity analysis (see Section VB) suggest that strict exogeneity holds. For the lagged dependent the identifying assumption may be violated if there are higher order convergence effects, and y t‫2מ‬ affects Dy t other than through Dy t‫1מ‬ . We will test the validity of the instruments using a Hansen overidentifying restrictions test. System estimation, which would imply estimating a level equation along with the difference equation, is not suitable as this requires the identifying assumption that the instruments are not correlated with the fixed effects. This is a problematic assumption since a main cause of concern for our analysis lies with confounding fixed effects. This also is reflected in the Hansen test results, which strongly reject the validity of the instruments in case of system GMM.
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V. Results
A. Static Analysis
We start by looking at the results from the static analysis, applying Specification 3 to pooled cross-section data. The estimated effects are given in Table 2 . The table only reports the coefficients for tariff exposure, omitting the other covariates for ease of presentation.
The basic specification (Model A) indicates that a decrease in tariff exposure is associated with a decrease in child work for 10-15 year old children, but the size of the effect varies by gender and between urban and rural areas. A percentage point decrease in labor weighted tariff exposure leads to a 1.5 percentage point decrease in work incidence. The effect is somewhat stronger for boys than for girls with point estimates of 1.7 percentage points for boys and 1.2 for girls. These results are mainly driven by the effect in rural districts, where the estimates are larger and more precise than for municipalities (1.4 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively).
Model B investigates differential effects by skill level. The tariff exposure measure is interacted with the level of education of the head of household, defined as (i) not completed primary school, (ii) completed primary school, (iii) completed secondary school, and (iv) completed higher education. The benefits of tariff reductions are relatively higher for low-skill households; this is the first indicative evidence that poorer (lower-skilled) households might have benefited more from tariff reductions. The differential benefits for children from lower-skilled headed households are also larger for boys and in rural districts. These results are in line with general StolperSamuelson type expectations, and show that the favourable income effects to the 16. The length of the panel (four rounds) does not allow us to meaningfully address dynamic effects that go beyond one time lag. The number of instruments used in the estimations is 25, and N‫.225ס‬ Table 2 Pooled results: Child market work incidence (aged 10-15 years) and tariff protection Sample Notes: Tariffs are weighted by labor shares. All models are estimated by OLS, weighted by sampling weights. All models include district fixed effects and region-year interactions, a full set of gender and age indicator interactions, controls for birth order and relationship status within the household, household size, and dummies on heads' education, heads' industry of main occupation (nine industries), female head, and living in a rural neighborhood. For the divided samples, rural districts refer to Kabupatens, urban districts to Kotas. Standard errors (clustered at district level) are in parentheses. **, *, † denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
poor must have dominated eventual substitution effects arising from increasing unskilled wages. A similar picture arises when differentiating the tariff effects by sector of main occupation of the household head (Model C). We distinguish between the three main sectors (agriculture, mining/manufacturing, and services) and a fourth category that includes other unclassified occupations and those inactive. The effects of tariff reductions are strongest for children from agricultural and manufacturing (and hence once again poorer) households, with the effects being somewhat larger, but also less precise, in urban districts. We also see beneficial effects for children in households where the head works in a fully protected sector (like services) or is inactive. This might be due to the overall poverty reducing effects of trade liberalization in the region.
The size of the estimated effect of tarif exposure decreases with the birth order of a child (Model D). The regressions show the differential estimates for the first three children born to a household, latter borns, and other relatives (which includes children from servants). The effect is much stronger for the first-and second-born. This is consistent with other findings that labour supply of older children in households is more responsive to postive shocks due to social policy reforms as compared to their younger siblings (Sparrow 2007) . For other relatives and servants we do not find a decrease for girls, only for boys.
Our measure of child work incidence ignores changes in child work hours by children that remain active in the labor market, in which case we may not capture the full impact of trade reforms. We therefore also explore the effects on work hours for boys and girls. The point estimates for work incidence and hours are similar in order of magnitude when compared to initial sample averages. Moreover, that subsequent GMM analysis with the pseudo-panel yields very similar results for work incidence and work hours. This would suggest that the estimated effect on work incidence provides a fair representation of the impact on child labor. The remainder of the analysis will therefore focus on work incidence.
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B. Sensitivity Analysis and Exogeneity Tests
The static results are based on district fixed effects, and could be confounding the effects of trade liberalization and differential growth paths. This section will examine this potential source of bias. The pseudo-panel first-difference results are presented in Table 3 . Column 1 shows that the effects of tariff changes on child work remain precise and are consistent with the pooled cross-section results, although the coefficients are slightly smaller, at 0.9 percentage point. There is no evidence of confounding social policy effects, as the tariff coefficients are robust to including the minimum wage and SSN scholarship variables (Column 2). 18 The test for strict 17. These results for work hours are reported in the supplemental appendix. As working children form a selective sample, we both present OLS and Tobit estimates on the weekly hours of work for all children. We also estimated the effects on domestic work (not shown here), which are small and not statistically significant, and therefore also ignored in the remainder of the analysis. 18. Because the social policy variables are potentially endogenous themselves, we omit them from our preferred GMM specification. Moreover, we do not find statistically significant effects of scholarships or minimum wage changes in the GMM analysis, while the tariff coefficients are robust to including these variables.
Table 3
Child market work incindence (aged 10-15 years) Notes: The dependent variables are expressed as district shares within the age group; further controls include first differences in the average age of children, the share of girls, the share of households with a household head with no education, adult literacy rates, the rural share, and a full set of region-year interactions. Initial conditions are 1993 labor shares of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, and transport (with utilities as reference group), adult literacy, and child market work incidence in districts. Standard errors (clustered at district level) are in parentheses. **, *, † denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
exogeneity of tariffs exposure with respect to child work in Column 3 does not reject the zero hypothesis of strict exogeneity. The estimated effect on child work also is robust to including the initial conditions of sector shares, the adult literacy rate, and child market work incindence, interacted with year dummy variables (Column 4), although the estimate loses precision when the interaction terms are included. 19 Finally, we find no correlation between child work and future tariff changes (Column 5). Summarizing, the results from Table 3 suggest that the negative relationship between tariff reduction and child work is not driven by omitted variables, or differential growth trajectories of district economies, and the reduction of the agricultural sector.
The economic crisis in 1997/98 also raises interpretational concerns, as the devaluation of the Rupiah resulted in short-term price spikes that affected especially the poor. Although the effect of the price spike has largely subsided by the 1999 Susenas round, and the overall negative effect of the crisis is controlled for by the region-time fixed effects, concerns may still remain that the crisis confounds the effects of tariff reductions. This is especially the case if the effects of the crisis were correlated with the economic structure of the districts. In order to investigate these concerns, Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 report difference estimates for two separated time periods : 1993-96 (precrisis) and 1999-2002 (postcrisis) . The results confirm the robustness of our findings, as they are largely unaffected by the split.
C. Dynamic Analysis
The main GMM estimation results for the dynamic specification are summarized in Table 4 , by gender, for rural and urban districts, by household head's education level and occupation category, and by birth order. 20 The results suggest that the local effects of tariff reductions are considerable: decreasing district tariff exposure by one percentage point leads to a decrease in child labor incidence of the 10-15 years old by around 0.9 percentage points. Recursive substitution over the four periods gives us an indication of the overall effect of the decrease in local tariff exposure: the tariff reductions explain around 70 percent of the average reduction of child labor of 9.0 percentage points. We also see some evidence of convergence, with a coefficient for the lagged dependent of 0.39, suggesting (changes in) child labor to decrease over time.
19. It also could be that convergence drives our results, if child labor decreases faster in districts with initial high child labor, which in turn would be correlated with the district tariff measures. We investigate this possible source of bias by introducing a lagged level of child labor in a difference specification of the dynamic model described in Equation 6. The results do provide evidence of convergence, but we find that the estimates for tariff changes are robust and remain statistically significant. These results are reported in the supplemental appendix. 20. Detailed results are reported in a supplemental appendix. Note that the Hansen overidentification test rejects the validity of the instruments at 10 percent level in four out of the 18 main subsamples (for urban households, heads with no education, heads in manufacturing, and second born). Hence, these results need to be interpreted with some caution, although we find no evidence of endogeneity of tariff exposure with respect to child work. Moreover, the robustness of the results across specifications and methods would suggest little scope for bias. The gender gap favors boys slightly and is comparable in magnitude to the pooled estimates. Decomposing the tariff effects for the rural and urban subsamples, these favorable effects appear to be mainly rural as we do not find robust effects for the urban districts. Child labor outcomes improve irrespective of household skill composition and these effects are only statistically significant in agricultural households and in the remainder category. The GMM results do not monotonically change by birth order, with the first and second born benefiting most from tariff reductions.
Our study remains largely a reduced form analysis, and we are not able to identify the main transmission channels through which child work is affected by reduced tariff exposure. Nevertheless, we can provide some global indication of the main mechanisms at work, by looking at the effects on district poverty profiles and adult employment.
Tariff reductions have led to a reduction in the extent and severity of poverty. Table 5 shows the estimated effects of reduced tariff exposure on the poverty head count ratio (Panel A) and the squared poverty gap (Panel B), where the model specification is similar to the earlier dynamic GMM. While the poverty head count merely records the fraction of the district population that cross an arbitrary level of consumption, the squared poverty gap reflects the curvature in the per capita expenditure distribution for the population living below the poverty line. The results show that a percentage point reduction in tariff exposure reduces the poverty headcount in districts by 1.2 percentage point, and also reduces inequality among the poor. In other words, the results seem to suggest that income effects play a role, in particular at the bottom end of the income distribution.
Addressing changes in workfoce participation by age category (Panel C), we see the strongest effects of tariff reductions for the age group of 13-15 years old, which is not surprising given the low incidence of child work among primary school age children. Moreover, tariff reductions do not impact workforce participation of cohorts older than 18. This would suggest that the effect of trade liberalization on child labor is not driven by substitution of child for adult labor, and that the observed income effects are not due to a labor supply response and reduced unemployment. Rather, income effects seem to be a result of relative wage increases, in particular for low-skill labor.
D. Alternative Measures of Tariff Exposure
Estimates for alternative measures of tariff exposure are given in Table 6 . Compared to the results weighted by labor shares, the estimated effects are smaller and less precise for GRDP weighted tariff exposure in case of the pooled data (Panel A), but are very much consistent with the pseudo-panel GMM results (Panel C). The results are robust to the manner in which nontraded goods are incorporated in the tariff exposure measure. Panels B and D show the results when we focus on tradable sector composition only, for the pooled and GMM analysis, respectively. The main differences observed when excluding the size of the nontradable sector from the weighting scheme is that both the gender and urban/rural gaps increase considerably, as the benefits of tariff reductions seem skewed to boys and urban households. Table 4 . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N‫805ס‬ in the total, 416 in the rural, and 92 in the urban sample; N‫225ס‬ in Panel C. **, *, † denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
VI. Conclusion
This paper examined the effects of trade liberalization on child work in Indonesia. In the 1990s, Indonesia went through a major reduction in tariff bar- Notes: For Panels A and B see the notes to Table 2 , for Panels C and D see the notes to Table 5 . **, *, † denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
riers, as average import tariff lines decreased from 17.2 percent in 1993 to 6.6 percent in 2002; a period that also saw reductions in child work. We identify the effects of trade liberalization by combining geographic variation in sector composition of the economy with temporal variation in tariff lines by product category. This yields geographic variation in changes in average exposure to trade liberalization over time, hence identifying geographical differences in the effects of trade policy. The results are robust to specification and sensitivity analysis, and we find no evidence of remaing sources of bias.
Our main findings suggest that Indonesia's trade liberalization experience in the 1990s has contributed to a strong decline in child labor, as decreased tariff exposure is associated with a decrease in work by 10-15-year-old children. The effects of tariff reductions increase with the age of children and decrease with their birth order, and are strongest for children from low-skill backgrounds and in rural areas. Through these effects, trade liberalization will have long-term welfare implications for human capital investments, in particular for low-skill, and presumably poorer, households.
Although our reduced form analysis can at best provide indirect evidence of the main transmission channels, we do find strong support for the hypothesis that reduction of child labor is driven by positive income effects from trade liberalization for the poorest. This is consistent with other studies, which argue that trade liberalization in Indonesia brought about a relative wage increase for low-skill labor, although causal effects are hard to confirm (Suryahadi 2001; Arnold and Smarzynska Javorcik 2005; Sitalaksmi et al. 2007 ). Further analysis of this causal relationship would be an area of future research.
The findings in this paper and mixed empirical evidence from other country studies would suggest that the potential benefits to be gained from trade liberalization, and its distributional implications, are indeed context-specific. The Indonesian context seems to have provided the preconditions needed to generate classic StolperSamuelson effects, partly facilitated by a coinciding process of structural change in the 1990s that saw a reallocation of labor from agriculture to services and manufacturing. In particular the mobility of low-skill labor seems to play an important role, which, combined with increased productivity and competitiveness, has led to better employment opportunities outside agriculture and increased returns to lowskill labor. Such cross-country heterogeneinty may be underlying the weak average effects of trade liberalization on child labor and human capital investments found at macro level, highlighting the importance of considering local economic contexts when propagating trade reforms and formulating subsequent social policy responses.
